claim that here we find``possibly Heidegger's most sustained and convincing effort'' on this topic (2003, page 199) . Although Heidegger's one reference to geography as a discipline, in an extended critique of the modern academy, is dismissive and throwaway (1989, page 153 , see also pages 145^159), the Beitra« ge has much to offer the continued rethinking of the theoretical basis of contemporary geography. Its contribution can, I think, be seen in two main areas: the notion of calculation and the issue of the relation between time and space, and the understandings of these terms. Thinking through notions about calculation is useful in debates about the difference between place and space, and in his remarks Heidegger himself touches upon issues of globalisation and the environment. The issue of time and space is important in terms of the relation between these two key terms, between history and geography, and between the issue of calculation and representations of these terms. However, in order to introduce these key themes, I look first not at what the Beitra« ge offers geography but to its own situation, the geographies of the Beitra« ge.
The geographies of the Beitra« ge Germany in 1936 was a country of contrasts. This was three years after Hitler had taken power, and quickly withdrawn from the League of Nations, one year after the Nuremberg laws on racial purity, and the Four Year Plan for economic growth began in September. The year 1936 also saw the reoccupation and militarisation of the Rhineland, an alliance with Mussolini, and the beginning of the Spanish civil war; Guernica was destroyed the following year. Germany's gearing up for a war economy was well underway and it was the incremental marginalisation of the Jews which made possible their later extermination. But, for much of Germany, increased employment and prosperity meant that things were better than they had been since 1914. The Berlin Olympics of 1936, in particular, were a showcase to a new Germany and a greatly exploited piece of political propaganda.
For Heidegger, there was a similarly contrasting set of circumstances. Tucked away in the Black Forest, in the university city of Freiburg, his childhood hometown of MeÞkirch, or in his mountain Hu« tte in Todtnauberg, he continued to think, write, and teach. Although his twice-yearly courses continued after the resignation and throughout the war, Heidegger found it increasingly difficult to publish, and so many of his writings from this period first appeared in postwar collections, notably Holzwege first published in 1950 (see Heidegger, 1977) . The restrictions on publications were because of political reasons, and, beneath the surface of Heidegger's rural idyl, political tensions seethed and festered. His own political involvement, as the rector of Freiburg University, had come to a crushing end two years previously. Initially harbouring na|« ve ambitions that the regime could be changed from within, with himself cast as the philosopher to Hitler as king, Heidegger had hoped for a reawakening of the German Volk to their spiritual destiny and a return to the West's heritage in Greek thought. Disappointed and embittered, Heidegger resigned the post, and returned to his role as professor of philosophy, the chair previously occupied by Husserl. (4) Heidegger remained in the Nazi party until the end of the war, and for some time after his resignation seemed to feel that the movement and Hitler could transcend the party. Nonetheless, his critical commentsöoften equivocal, regularly ambiguous, and usually guardedödo begin to surface from 1934 onwards. Retrospectively, he would suggest that these were his declarations of`spiritual resistance'. If this is far too strong, what he does say is worth attention.
(4) The literature on this is vast, but for some useful perspectives see Bambach (2003) ; de Beistegui (1998); Janicaud (1996) ; Ott (1993) ; Thomson (2003) .
It is notable that Heidegger had, in his own words, remained in the provinces. Refusing two calls to a chair in Berlin, first in 1931 and then in late 1933, Heidegger had chosen to stay in the land he had been born into.`O n a steep slope of a wide mountain valley in the southern Black Forest, at an elevation of 1150 metres, there stands a small ski hut [Skihu« tte]. The floor plan measures six metres by seven. The low-hanging roof covers three rooms: the kitchen which is also the living room, a bedroom and a study. Scattered at wide intervals throughout the narrow base of the valley and on the equally steep slope opposite, lie the farmhouses with their large over-hanging roofs. Higher up the slope the meadows and pasture lands lead to the woods with its dark fir-trees, old and towering. Over everything there stands a clear summer sky, and in its radiant space two hawks glide around in wide circles '' (1981, page 27; 1983a, page 9 ). Heidegger's description of his`work world' continues, as he talks about how this landscape is conducive to his writingöthe solitude rather than lonelinessöand to his integration into the peasant environment.``The inner relationship of my own work to the Black Forest and its people comes from a centuries-long and irreplaceable rootedness [Bodensta« ndigkeit] in the Alemannian-Swabian soil' ' (1981, page 27; 1983a, pages 10^11) . This rootedness in the soil is important in terms of both Heidegger's politics and his philosophy. Although this would be developed in his later works as the notion of dwelling, which has occasioned much interest in geography (for example, Cloke and Jones, 2001; Harrison, forthcoming; Seamon and Mugerauer, 1985) ,`dwelling' is not yet a term that has been worked through in Heidegger's thought. (5) Instead, Heidegger is contrasting his rural existence with the asphalt alienation of the big city. Romantic and reactionary, rootedness is politically, as Bambach (2003) has shown, a tragic^comic repetition of Greek myths of autochthony. But it is important to note here, because it is also Heidegger's opposed term to the domination which he would later call`technology' and what, at this time, he called Machenschaft (machination).
Todtnauberg was therefore for Heidegger a retreat from Freiburg, but, after his resignation as rector, it was the place where, like Plato, he returned from Syracuse (Gadamer, 1989) . It was here that he wrote Being and Time, and where the Beitra« ge was largely composed. The Beitra« ge is a work whose potentials can be hard to discern; it is written in a stuttering, disjointed style, conceptually opaque, and filled with references to other parts of Heidegger's work, to the tradition, and, in extremely muted form, to contemporary events. Its vast resources are akin to a working draft, bringing together themes either published or discussed in publicöthat is, in Heidegger's lectures and seminarsöwith those which appeared only in published work many years later or indeed never saw the light of day in his own lifetime. It requires quite extensive knowledge of Heidegger's other writings before it begins to make sense, and, indeed, Heidegger himself ordained that the Beitra« ge should be published only in his Gesamtausgabe (collected edition) after all of his lecture courses (volumes 17^63 of this edition) had appeared. He believed that only then would readers be ready for it (see von Herrmann, 1989, page 513) . In fact, in 1989, eighteen of these volumes had not yet been published.
Heidegger's lecture courses from 1936 to 1938 included three on Nietzsche (1985; 1986a; , the first two of which appear in revised form in the 1961 book Nietzsche (1991; [1961 ), one each on Schelling (1988a) and Kant (1984b) , and a course that is often thought to be the best single introduction to the Beitra« ge, Grundfragen der Philosophie (Basic questions of philosophy) (1984c; 1994a; see von Herrmann 1989, page 513) . In terms of the themes I will argue are of relevance to geography, this last course offers relatively little, except for a remarkable inventory of how the course was originally to have been delivered. I reproduce it here in full: we should note that the course as actually delivered was largely confined to the first point, and the draft found as an appendix to the lecture course (1984c, pages 195^223; 1994b, pages 168^186) ' (1984c, page 193; 1994a, page 167) . There is a lot that could be said of this, much of which is well known in terms of scholarship on Heidegger and perhaps of marginal relevance to his contribution to geography. But it is worth noting briefly two points because of their importance to Heidegger's work. One is Heidegger's archaic spelling of being, as Seyn instead of Sein, which along with many commentators [but in contrast to Rojcewicz and Schuwer (Heidegger, 1994a) , and indeed to Emad and Maly in 1999] I have rendered as the English word`beyng', which is similarly old. The point is that Heidegger wants to retrieve a sense of being that is not tainted with metaphysics. A similar intent is found in Heidegger's well-known translation of the Greek aletheia, commonly rendered as truth', as`unconcealedness', preserving the alpha privative of the Greek: truth is a bringing of something into the open, and the notion of truth as correctness (see point X) or veracity is a later invention (see 1988b) .
More important to the overall argument is the term Da-sein, a common word for existence' but which here is hyphenated by Heidegger to draw out the root meanings of`being' Sein, and`there', Da. Although this term is usually untranslated in English, it has sometimes been rendered as`being-there'. Straightforward appropriations of this in a purely spatial sense largely miss Heidegger's point, because the term is better understood as`being-the-there', the openness to being of human existence (see 1989, page 17) .
Reading this as a straightforward spatial term is misleading, but there is a profound thinking through of issues around space to be found in Heidegger's work which is merely hinted at here. In particular, the notions of the`abyss' and the Zeit^Spiel^Raum and the suggestion that common understandings of space and time are ones determined by metaphysics promise much. And point VIII, with its juxtaposition of the abyss and the strife, and with it the juxtaposition of earth and world, recalls vocabulary found in Heidegger's 1935^36 lecture``On the origin of the work of art '' (1977, see especially pages 35^36, 42; see also 1989, pages 30, 398^399, 408, 510) . All of these themes are important in terms of the Beitra« ge, but I would contend that here they are merely promissory notes, and that, rather than being useful in terms of understanding the Beitra« ge, they are really understood only in the context of that work. In some respects this is also true for the confrontation with Nietzscheöwhat Heidegger would call an Auseinandersetzung, a`setting-apart-from-another'. Whereas the Beitra« ge's comments on the notion of Augenblicköthe famous word used by Martin Luther concerning`the twinkling of an eye' in his translation of Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians, and later utilised by Nietzsche as the`moment' of the eternal recurrenceötrade upon work in the Nietzsche courses, (6) on other issues it is other way round. For example, in a discussion of the notion of Zeit^Raum Heidegger explicitly makes reference to the unpublished manuscript (1985, page 286) .
As with so much of Heidegger's later work, it is in the 1935 lecture course`An introduction to metaphysics' that more useful clues can be gleaned. The openings are particularly found in the famous comments on geopolitics:`T his Europe, in its unholy blindness always on the point of cutting its own throat, lies today in the great pincers between Russia on the one side and America on the other. Russia and America, seen metaphysically, are both the same: the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless [bodenlosen] ' (1953, pages 28^29) . Although the Germanic thrust of this is deeply problematicöit is the German Volk that lies`in the pincers', that is, the`metaphysical Volk'öthere is something that goes beyond this here. Perhaps, most obviously, there is the sarcastic reference to thè triumph' that can be tallied through numbers at mass meetings. Is it necessary to note that Leni Riefenstahl's contemporary film of the Nuremberg rallies The Triumph of the Will had been released the year of Heidegger's lectures? Then there is the advent of a mechanised and technological`globalisation', a process where the earth is but a ball, conceived as a whole, conquered and exploited. Again the notion of machination is anticipated, but without a full development. Heidegger's point about rapidity, instantaneity, and simultaneity is more nuanced than a simple translation can capture. Schnell is the word for speed, and so this captures something of the transitory, accelerated nature of time; Augenblick is the`moment' discussed above; and Gleichzeitigkeit implies each moment of time (Zeit) being made the same (Gleich). The mournful references to the``destruction of the earth'' and the``reduction of human beings to a mass [die Vermassung des Menschen]'' which follow (1953, page 29) equally hint at the political opportunities beyond the straightforward ones we might associate with Heidegger.`T he prevailing dimension became that of extension and number [Ausdehnung und der Zahl ] ... . In America and Russia, then, this all intensified until it turned into the measureless [maÞlose] so-on-and-so-forth of the ever-identical and the indifferent [Immergleichen und Gleichgu« ltigen], until finally this quantitative temper became a quality of its own' ' (1953, page 35) . Slightly further down that page, Heidegger offers a discussion of how that highly charged Hegelian word Geist ö usually translated as`spirit' or`mind ö when rendered as mere Intelligenz, is examining and calculating (Berechnung und Betrachtung ). What is interesting is that this way of thinking is seen in action in three potential realms:``the regulation and domination [die Regelung und Beherrschung] of the material conditions of production'';``the intelligent ordering [Ordnung und Erkla« rung] of everything that is present and already posited at any time''; and as``applied to the organisational regulation [der organisatorischen Lenkung] of the vital resources and race of a Volk [der Lebensmasse und Rasse eines Volkes]'' (page 29). Heidegger notes that the first is found in Marxism, the second in positivismöby which he surely means its American form. He does not name the third, but note this was 1935, and it was delivered in Nazi Germany (1953, pages 35^36) . As Kisiel notes, too strongly but on the right track,`t hus the practice of German National Socialism is, already in 1935,`metaphysically the same' as that of Americanism and Russian Communism'' (2001a, page 240) .
If this is the situation in Germany, and of the Beitra« ge in German, how is it to translate it, to carry it across, into the modernday Anglophone world and into the English language? Aside from the obvious problems of reading a book almost seventy years after it was first written, with the difficulties of recognising all the allusions and contexts of Heidegger's time, the English-language reader is faced with a translation which has tended to invite severe criticism (for example, Bambach, 2000) . Emad and Maly have, to their credit, brought this work into English in some form, and allowed wider discussion of this text to begin. Faced with the text they had to work with, one can only have sympathy for their task. That said, several contentious decisions have been made here, and the book needs to be retranslated as it is read. Essentially, Emad and Maly have overtranslated to an alarming degree. For example, Wesen, essence or character, has been translated as`essential sway', or sometimes, when it implies das Eigenste einer Sache (what is ownmost to something), as`what is ownmost', and then at times it is rendered as`way of being'. Although a recognition of the importance Heidegger puts on this word is necessary, to translate continually with different words or phrases obscures the point (see de Beistegui, 2003, pages 87^89; Sallis, 2001, page 196) . Similarly, the choice of`en-owning' for Ereignis is deeply problematic, the word having a common meaning of`event' and a sense of`appropriation' or`propriation' (see Casey, 1997, page 278; Elden, 2003a, pages 37^38; Krell, 1992, page 231) . This is why I have regularly revised the translation of passages and terms taken from the Beitra« ge, which has the additional advantage of allowing some of the wordplay around key terms to emerge. It is for this reason that many German terms are included in brackets within the text, and that quite a bit of stress is given to word association and etymology. As both Heidegger and Nietzsche have shown, the analysis of words can reveal much about meanings that have become obscured or forgotten. The use of language is a crucial tool in Heidegger's mode of argumentation, and, for that reason, it is necessary to pay careful attention to what he actually says.
Calculation and politics
The political background established above is important, as Heidegger's work on measure (MaÞ ) and calculation (Rechnung) has to be understood in the context of its time, and it is perhaps here ö more than any other theme in the Beitra« ge with the exception of raceöthat the political intrudes. (7) The word`measure' is MaÞ, which derives from messen, to measure or to gauge. Heidegger continually works with words that share this stem. We have already seen Massenversammlungen, the mass meetings; Vermassung, the reduction to a mass or measure; and Lebensmasse, vital resources. More broadly, in those references to Einfu« hrung in die Metaphysic (an introduction to metaphysics) (1953) we saw how Heidegger believed all had been condensed to (7) For a much more detailed account see Elden (2003a) . These themes are developed in Elden (2005a) . extension and number. One of the most important of these related words in a political context is Gema« Þheit, a word vital to national socialism, which means conformity or accord, the removal of dangerous elements as things are brought together around a fixed measure or norm. In this it is directly related to the better known concept of Gleichschaltung, which implies political coordination, literally`same wiring' or connection', the bringing into line and elimination of opposition, subordinating things to a common measure (see Friedlander, 1980; Klemperer, 2000) . The other key theme is the gearing up of the economy, particularly in the Four Year Plan (see Kisiel, 2001a) . A running theme of the Beitra« ge concerns the problems of mechanistic, calculative ways of looking at the world. For Heidegger, by this time, it is increasingly obvious that Nazism is a continuation of this problematic, rather than its potential solution, which he had at one point patently believed.
Indeed, Heidegger's lifelong claim that the tradition has forgotten or is oblivious to being is seen, in the Beitra« ge, as dependent on three things, three concealments (Verhu« llungen): calculation (die Berechnung), acceleration or rapidity (die Schnelligkeit ), and massiveness (Massenhaften, that root again) (1989, pages 120^121). These three themes are necessarily related, the second and third being particular ways of celebrating quantitative growth, with the obvious dual relations to time and spaceöquicker times and greater extension. Calculation, a particular way of taking measure that increasingly becomes the only way, requires all things to be adjusted in its light: the incalculable is only the not yet calculable. The last of the three, massiveness, is related to a term Heidegger calls the gigantic (das Riesenhafte) (1989, pages 135^138, 441^443). There are three candidates for giganticism in 1930s Germany: the Leviathan, a state of unlimited and undivided sovereignty on the Hobbesian model; the Behemoth that became the symbol of the Nazi war machine; and the Hindenberg airship which had burst into flames in 1937 (see Kisiel, 2001b; Neumann, 1942; de Syon, 2002) .`T he gigantic was determined as that through which the`quantitative' is transformed into its own`quality', a kind of magnitude [Gro« Þe]. The gigantic is thus not something quantitative that begins with a relatively high number (with number and measurement)öeven though it can appear superficially as`quantitative'. The gigantic is grounded upon the decidedness and invariability of`calculation' and is rooted in a prolongation of subjective re-presentation unto the whole of beings' ' (1989, page 441) . (8) This theme of the quantitative as a quality in itself is important. The quale of something is its whatness, effectively its way of being, or, in the traditional sense, its essence. That the quantitative has become a quality is an important shift. The gigantic, for Heidegger, is not merely a quantity of dramatic proportions, but is his name for this shift. In other works, as I have traced elsewhere (2001b; 2003a), Heidegger sees Descartes as the crucial moment of this development. Descartes sees the world as`m echanical nature, that is, extension'' (Heidegger, 1988a, page 103) . What is important here is how the shift to seeing`what is' as`what can be calculated' plays out politically. Essentially, the current malaise is seen in terms of the twin themes of order (Ordnung) and calculation. These two are related to each other in that dividing something into elements helps to establish control over it, as these can be organised, rendered, and further divided, or grouped and forced into similarity.
Heidegger's critiques of the Nazi concept of`new order' (Neue Ordnung) and their notion of Lebensraum are notably not from any moralising position, nor are they even explicitly political, but they are seen as examples of the greater problem of nihilism and the culmination of metaphysics in technology (1986b, pages 139^141; 1998, page 143) . Calculability is an essential prerequisite for mechanism (1989, page 376) , and more generally the notion of machination is highly dependent on this particular way of grasping the world. In a particularly striking passage, Heidegger interrogates this.`T he machine, its essence. ' (1989, page 392) . There are several things that can be said here. In a few places Heidegger notes the relation between thought of machination and previous understandings of poiesis and techne. This is a complicated issue which deserves a little more examination. In his seminal reading of the Nicomachean Ethics Book Six (Aristotle, 1909 crucial for both his own work and a generation of European thinkers öGadamer, Arendt, Strauss, and Klein, to name but a fewöHeidegger (1992) stresses the connections and distinctions between techne, episteme, phronesis, sophia, and nous öthe five ways the mind arrives at truth (aletheuein). These would usually be translated as art or skill; scientific knowledge; practical wisdom or prudence; philosophic wisdom; and intellectual. For us here, the most important distinction is between techne and phronesis. These two intellectual virtues are distinct because they relate to poiesis and praxis, which are two entirely separate realms of human activity: production or making as opposed to action or doing. Phronesis is related to praxis and techne to poiesis. Techne is an intellectual virtue concerned with making as it is logou alethous poietike¨öthat is, a mode of logos aiming for truth concerned with production (Aristotle, 1909 . In stressing this distinction Heidegger indicates the separation of our everyday dealing with equipment in the world, and insight into our actions explored in Being and Time (1962; 1967) . The first division of the published book, concerned with the techne of poiesis, examines our relation to beings which do not share our way of being, such as objects, tools,``trees, stones, land, sea'', in the Umweltöthe surrounding world or environment. The second division looks at the phronesis of praxis, the way we deal with beings that share our way of being, other humans, in the Mitwelt (the with-world or shared world) (Heidegger, 1992, page 386; see Elden, 2005a; Kisiel, 1995, page 179) .
Machination (Machenschaft) is a mode of making (machen). The former is usually associated with``a`bad' type of human activity and plotting for such an activity'' (Heidegger, 1989, page 126 ), but Heidegger is interested in retrieving a sense of how it impacts on the issue of being. The latter is, however, unquestionably a human comportment: Heidegger adds``poiesis, techne'' (page 126) in parenthesis here to underline the point. That said, he wants to stress that this comportment is possible only on the basis of a particular interpretation of beingsöthat is, of physis, the Greek term that encompasses nature and the physical more generally. Heidegger's ongoing critique of Descartes is revealing in the way he shows how notions of measure have changed over time. This historical investigationörelated to the one around concepts of space I will discuss in the next sectionöis something that appears in many forms in his work. A number of important works in the history of science have made progress in this inquiry, something which is still somewhat underdeveloped in geography. Examinations of the relation between geography and mathematics have tended to concentrate on the mathematics of geography, the quantitative revolution. More recent reassessments have noted the importance of a related issue, that of the geographies of mathematics (Barnes and Hannah, 2001a; Philo, 1998) . Much of the interesting work on this area develops ideas found in the work of Foucault, particularly around notions of governmentality and biopower (for example, Hannah, 2000) . (9) But, although Foucault is extremely interesting in terms of conceptual and historical work, I would suggest that philosophically this is developed much more explicitly in Heidegger's work. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere (2001a), much of Foucault's work in this area is closely related to some of Heidegger's claims.
Heidegger pursues this theme across the Beitra« ge and a comprehensive summary is impossible. Let me confine myself to three points: first, the relation between machination and lived experience. Although we might appeal to a more`authentic', vitalist, experiential way of thinking as a reaction against cold mechanism and calculation, Heidegger suggests that`lived experience', Erlebnis, shares a common foundation with machination, made most obvious in Descartes (Heidegger, 1984c, page 149; 1989, pages 123^124, 129, 131^134; 1994a, page 129) . Second, thinking machination back through its root in techne may provide a way into the issue of being, albeit from one of its most oblique angles (1989, page 132). We can see this if we look at the way Heidegger retrieves so much from his reading of Aristotle (Heidegger, 1992) . Third, and in most detail, there is the issue of world^earth, raised in an earlier quotation as a question but invoked in other places as a direct problem.
The problem of world^earth opens up contemporary concerns with the environment and globalisation, which Heidegger was grappling with. If his credentials as a foundational theorist of certain types of ecological thinking are well known, through an engagement with his writings on technology and poetic dwelling (Foltz, 1995; Zimmerman, 1993) , what is less understood is how such themes emerged in his work of the 1930s, within this particular political context, most notably in the Beitra« ge. Heidegger's argument is complicated, and hinges on the reduction of the Greek physis to the Latin natura, the root for our term`nature'. For Heidegger, even in 1936^38, in technology (die Technik) nature is destroyed because it is separated from human beings, it is seen as a separate realm from human existence. In part, this is the argument against Descartes found in Being and Time, where Descartes's separation of the mind and body is challenged with the idea of being-in-the-world. Heidegger argues that the originary, more rooted sense of physis is lost as nature is seen as a being itself,``and, after this demoting [Absetzung] , ultimately reduced to the full force of calculating machination and economy' ' (1989, page 277) . Nature becomes res extensa, an extended material resource. The natural no longer has any``immediate relation to physis, but rather is fully set-up [gestellt ] according to the machinational'' (page 133). Recent debates in geography have demonstrated that the problematic division of the social and the natural needs to be rethought, but also that the idea of the production of nature is worth investigating (see Castree, 1995; Castree and Braun, 1998; Demeritt, 2002; Gregory, 2001 ). Heidegger's argument here is not merely that nature is never pure but is always already social, but also that the very idea of`nature' in some supposedly pure state is already a reductive understanding. This perhaps adds another angle into this ongoing debate.
Heidegger talks of the human reduction and``transition to a technicised animal, which begins to replace the instincts, which have already grown weaker and less refined by the giganticism of technology [der Technik]' ' (1989, page 98, emphasis in original) . In this reduction, nature becomes merely scenery and a place for recreation, and even in this it is arranged for the masses as a form of the gigantic (page 277). Very similar language would be used for the Rhine river in the later``Question concerning technology'' essay (2000, pages 7^36), which also makes use of the crucial term Ge-Stell, enframing or the setup, which names the essence of technology. In the earliest form of this lecture, from 1949, the title was``Das Ge-Stell'' (1994b, pages 24^45). For Heidegger, the prospects are bleak.`T he human might for centuries yet pillage and lay waste to the planet with their machinations, the gigantic character of this driving might`develop' into something unimaginable and take on the form of a seeming rigour as the massive regulating of the desolate as suchöyet the greatness of beyng continues to be closest off (1989, page 408) . The key issue is the separation of world and earth. Earth, a more rooted experience, is lost in the technologised world through the advent of a globalisation that reduces the earth to a ball, to the world made picture, rationalised, calculated, and controlled. Calculation here plays a key role. It is not just the impact of technology that must be investigated, but the very thing that makes it possible: calculation.``Must nature be surrendered and abandoned to machination?'' asks Heidegger.``Are we still capable of seeking earth anew?' ' (1989, page 278) .
Time^space and the Abgrund For geographers, perhaps the most crucial part of the manuscript is the discussion of the notion of time^space (Zeit^Raum) in sections 238^242 (1999, pages 371^388) . It is potentially through these that we might be able to rethink the notion of earth. These sections are anticipated by an earlier comment, which sums up the key aspects of the discussion.`O ne must first generally attempt to think the essence of time so originally (in its ecstasis') that it becomes graspable as the possible truth for beyng [Seyn] as such. But already thinking time through in this way brings it, in its relatedness to the Da of Da-sein, into an essential relationship with the spatiality of Da-sein and thus with space (compare`Grounding' [Part 5 of the Beitra« ge, in which sections 238^242 are found]). But measured against their ordinary representations, time and space are here more originary; and ultimately, they are time^space, which is not a coupling of time and space but what is more originary in their belonging together' ' (1989, page 189) . Three points can be made about this: the relation between time and space; the attempt to think time and space without notions of calculation; and the notion of the abyss.
The treatment of time and space together is a correction of the one-sided analyses of Being and Time. Time here is the possible truth for being (and the nonmetaphysical beyng at that), but it must be thought in relation to space in this regard, unlike in Being and Time when temporality was the guiding clue for the question of being (see also 1989, pages 191^193). In this alone it is clear that Heidegger is trying to think their relation, which in itself is important in contemporary debates within geography.
As I have argued elsewhere, the issue of the reassertion of space within social theory can neither be at the expense of time, nor allow space to be assimilated into an otherwise unproblematised historical method (Elden, 2001a ; for a related argument see Lefebvre, 2004) . Indeed, Heidegger's suggestion is more than time^space needing to be thought together, instead of apart. Time^space is not simply the coupling of time and space, but the very notion that allows each to be thought distinctly. Zeit^Raum is not the same as Zeitraum öthat is, a span of time, a notion that betrays a measured, mathematical sense. Thinking the idea of time (the Wesen, the essence of time), forces usöthrough the notion of the Da, the there or the here of being, being-the-thereöto come to terms with space. The reverse is also the case. However, we should note the caution that neither time nor space here are understandable in terms of``their ordinary representations'', a point hinted at above in the passage from the Grundfragen der Philosophie (Basic questions of philosophy) (Heidegger, 1984c, page 193; 1994b, page 167) . Time^space takes on a particularly privileged role in the Beitra« ge, as`o riginally the site for the moment of propriation [Augenblicks-Sta« tte des Ereignisses]'' (1989, page 30, see also page 235). Although this is perhaps more important for Heidegger scholarship than for geography, we should note that this is the way to understand the notion of Da-sein, as``the site for the moment of the grounding of the truth of beyng'' (page 323, see also pages 374^375). Da-sein, which öaccording to Being and Time öis the being for whom, in its being, its being is in question (1967, page 11) , is here seen as similarly related to this key issue.
Heidegger suggests that time^space needs to be thought in a way distinct from the mathematical calculative understanding of time and space. Time is not simply a fourth coordinate or parameter (Parameter), a t, to add to the three coordinates of space, the Cartesian x, y, and z (1989, page 377). In such a way of thinking,``space and time are merely strung together, after both have been levelled off in advance unto the same of what is countable [Za« hlbaren] and what makes counting possible [Za« hlung Ermo« glichenden]'' (page 377). Problems arise in trying to think space and time in any way other than quantitatively,``at most as forms of these quantities'' (page 136). Heidegger's way of thinking the problem of calculationöwhich is relevant, as I suggested above, to a whole range of inquiriesöis central to his thinking of the issue of time^space more generally (see Elden, 2001a; 2005a) . The notion of time^space has important affinities to the breadth of Heidegger's project here, as when he suggests that the``time^space character of decision to be grasped as the bursting cleft or fissure [aufbrechende Klu« ftung] of beyng itself, that is being-historically and not morally-anthropologically'' (1989, page 103, emphasis in original; see Krell, 1992, page 202) .
Time^space is therefore more originary than both time and space separately and the idea of four-dimensional space^time. Zeit^Raum should not be separated into space and time, but they must be thought together, with a lack of a distance between them. The term also seeks to exceed a straightforward understanding of all historical events as`somewhen' and`somewhere' (Heidegger, 1989, page 377) . This is not to say that they are entirely invalid ways of thinking, but that they are reductive and limited. For Heidegger, the standard form of knowing``will be above all relegated to the naturally limited sphere of its accuracy [or correctness, Richtigkeit]'' (page 378). Heidegger's counterexample is valuable in thinking through concerns with performativity and embodiment, where he attempts to use examples of these ways of being as access to the question itself. He suggests that if we take a number of everyday issuesö nearness and distance, emptiness and gifting, energy and hesitation (Na« he und Ferne, Leere und Schenkung, Schwung und Zo« gerung)öwe should not try to think them in terms of the usual representations of space and time, but try to think space and time differently through them, because``within them lies the hidden essence [verhu« llte Wesen] of time^space'' (page 372). Why might this be hidden? Once again the German shows us more easily than English can about Heidegger's intent. The three concealments of being, the Verhu« llungen, are at play here, particularly in the way calculation, acceleration, and massiveness relate to and impact on our understanding of time and space.
It should of course be mentioned that we cannot simply try to return to the origin, a way of thinking before the metaphysical fall. We cannot simply turn back metaphysics. Rather, we need to think historically about the problem, and retrace thè`d escent out of the history [die Herkunft aus der Geschichte]'' (page 372):`W e need to show how it happens that space and time become framing representation (ordo-concept [row or rank]) (`forms of intuition') for`mathematical' calculation and why these concepts of space and time dominate all thinking, even and precisely where one speaks of`experienced time [erlebter Zeit]' (Bergson and others)'' (page 373). (10) In such an inquiry into the history of the concepts of space and time, there will be various stages. For Heidegger the key events are the following: 1. Aristotle's Physics öparticularly the analysis of topos and khronos in Physics book 4 (Aristotle, 1936) . But even here, pou and pote¨(the where and when) are categories, determinations of beingness, ousia. 2. The Christian interpretation of beings, which seemingly keeps the`results' of Aristotle. By this Heidegger means scholasticism, in all its many varieties, a topic which he does not treat in anything like sufficient detail (see Lang, 1992; . In this period Heidegger contends that we see the replacement of ousia with substantia, a revised reading of the term megethos from a notion of stretch to that of the continuum, and the idea of space as sensorium Dei (Sense of God). 3. Space and time in Leibniz's work and the notion of mathesis (learning, especially mathematically). We might add Descartes in this chronology here, just as Heidegger usually does. 4. In Kant, time and space are attributed to the human subject, a determination which is challenged, but not fundamentally, by Nietzsche (Heidegger, 1989, page 373, see also pages 70^71, 207^208, 376) . This is an inquiry which looks at``why and under what assumptions is the breaking apart of space and time historically necessary?' ' (1989, page 373) . In this we have two historical inquiries, but inquiries of the conditions of possibility for things to be as they are: what might be called, in Heideggerian^Foucauldian manner, historical ontology, in other words a historicisation of the Kantian problematic (Elden, 2003b; Hacking, 2002) . Although Heidegger does suggest that we need to be careful in this, (11) we can do some interesting things with such thinking: in particular, tracing the relations between mathematical and philosophical conceptions of space and their political and geographical counterparts. This relation is not straightforwardly causal, in that one makes the other, but it is revealing to trace their connections. Such an analysis is at the heart of Casey's history of the concept of place (1997) and is something I have tried to pursue in relation to the idea of territory.
(10) On the problem of experience (see Elden, 2003a, pages 47^49; Heidegger, 1989, page 74) . (11)``B ut all of these historical expositions, frequently attempted since the nineteenth century, are blind and useless and without real philosophical questioning, apart from the fact that they merely pick thè passages' out of each respective context of inquiry and line them up, The history [Geschichte] of thesè representations' is the history of the truth of beyng [Geschichte der Wahrheit des Seyns] and can be fruitfully brought into a sharper philosophical focus only with the history of the guiding-question [Geschichte der Leitfrage]. Everything else is scholarly pretence, merely misleading even more to the superficiality of collecting and comparing passages'' (1989, pages 378^379).
The key argument in this ongoing work is that space and place should not be distinguished on the basis of scale, but that space emerges in Western thought through a particular way of grasping place. This way of grasping is to see place as something extensible and calculable, extended in three dimensions, and grounded on the geometric point. On this understanding, territory is not merely a political way of conceiving land, but the political corollary of this emergent concept of space. What this means is that although territory is integrally related to the state, in that both the modern state and the modern concept of territory emerge at the same historical juncture, it does not necessarily follow that territory is inherently tied to the state. The historical moment we call globalisation demonstrates that the calculable understanding of space has been extended to the globe, which means that even as the state becomes less the focus of attention territory remains of paramount importance. Territory therefore is a political way of conceiving of calculable space (see Elden, 2005b) .
Beyond such historical analyses, Heidegger's suggestionöand quite possibly the most complicated one he makes in the Beitra« ge in relation to geographyöis that we should think time^space as Abgrund. What does he mean by this? Abgrund is the German word for abyss, so time^space is abyssal, unfathomable, without ground. Is this our impossible, the impassable, the shattering encounter of the immeasurable void? Heidegger declares that``Ab-grund is the originary essency of ground. Ground is the essence of truth [Ab-grund ist die urspru« ngliche Wesung des Grundes. Der Grund ist das Wesen der Wahrheit]' ' (1989, page 379) . This shares an affinity with the notion of fissure or cleft, Klu« ftung, as noted above, which can also mean crevasse or chasm, and related words such as Zerklu« ftung, the fissured or the indented.`The Leap' öpart 4 of the Beitra« geöis concerned with the way the other beginning is the``leap into the en-cleft middle of the turn of propriation' ' (1989, page 231; see pages 235^239, 244; Krell, 1992, pages 202^203) .
There are a range of words that share an etymological kinship with Abgrund, including Grund, Ungrund, Urgrund, gru« nden, Gru« nder, and Gru« ndung (Emad and Maly, 1999, pages xxx^xxii) . Grund is related to the English`ground', which like Grund comes from the Old High German word grunt. But there is also the Latinatè found', from fundus, and these two terms help to get a sense of what Heidegger is driving at. Several of the available translations of Heidegger's lecture courses have titles such as`The fundamental concepts of metaphysics' or`The basic problems of phenomenology'. The key word in both is Grund: Grundbegriffe or Grundprobleme. Heidegger was always concerned with the fundamental, the foundational, the grounding issues.`Found' and`fundamental' both come from the same root, fundare. However, Grund also means`bottom',`root',`basis', and can also, like in English, mean the reason or grounds for something.
For Emad and Maly, Abgrund is not abyss, but in regular German it is. (12) It would make German readers think of abyss, chasm, depth, or precipice, and therefore force them to think this term more carefully when they see it on the page, to sidestep what might be thought by the term in its standard use, and so it should be for English readers. To coin a word such as`abground' means that the reader already knows that it is unusual, peculiar, and problematic, rather than letting the sense emerge from the discussion. Heidegger notes that``Der Ab-grund ist Ab-grund ' ' (1989, page 379) öthat is, Abgrund is not wholly negative. We should perhaps compare its structure to the term aletheia, translated above as unconcealment, which is not something that has a negative (12) Heidegger uses it in its standard form in a few places. See, for example,``the animal is separated from man by an Abgrund '' (1983b, page 384), and the suggestion that in relation to biologism there is an``abgru« ndig that separates Nietzsche from all this'' (1996, volume 1, page 510).
connotation, but one of bringing something into the open, revealing it. Abgrund could simply mean something like`groundless', or potentially`from ground',`by ground',`away from ground'.
In fact, the English`abyss' does a lot of this work. It comes from the late Latin abyssus, itself a simple transliteration of the Greek abyssos, basically the alphaprivative with bathos, depth. From this word we get the English`bathos', meaning depth, but also meaning the rhetorical device of a move from the elevated to the commonplace, after Alexander Pope. In a sense Abgrund follows the same path the other way, so we might think of a notion of`abathos', a move from the commonplace to the elevation of being. In other words, it is a move from the everyday nearness and distance, emptiness and gifting, energy and hesitation (Na« he und Ferne, Leere und Schenkung, Schwung und Zo« gerung) to the question of being. Such things function as a mode of access to this question of being.`T he a-byss as the first essence of ground grounds (lets the ground essence as ground) in the way of temporalising and spatialising [Der Ab-grund als erste Wesung des Grundes gru« ndet (la« Þt den Grund als Grund wesen) in der Weise der Zeitigung und Ra« umung]' ' (1989, page 383) . The abyssal then, feet gripping the edge, tottering on the rim of the precipice. Without ground, without depth, or, rather, from ground, from the depths. An impossible encounter that makes possible what follows. From the Ab-grund comes the Grund, from the abyss, the foundation, and this``in the way of temporalising and spatialising''. Unfortunately, the resemblance to abatos, impassable, is visual rather than etymological, although it is clear that the impasse becomes a way, just as the abyss grounds. If we try therefore to fathom the unfathomable, it must be through taking our measure from the immeasurable, rather than the other way round: in other words, we should not see the incalculable as simply the not-yet-calculable. Just as the abathos move takes us from the commonplace to the question of being, so too should our notion of measure emerge from an engagement with the world, through those everyday issues noted above. We should, therefore, not think them in relation to a preexisting sense of space and time, but allow a sense of space and time to emerge from thinking them.
Conclusion
I have attempted here to show how Heidegger's Beitra« ge zur Philosophie can offer much by way of a contribution to geography. There are doubtless several potential issues of interest within this complex work, a resource I have only touched upon, but I have concentrated on two main concerns, intimately related: the issue of calculation and the understanding of time^space. Heidegger's work on these two issues opens up a whole range of questions and perspectives. These includeöbut surely cannot be reduced toöthe question of what it means to calculate, and how understandings of measure and number may have changed; the interrelation and conceptualisation of time, space, and time^space, both theoretically and from a historical perspective; and the connections between technology or machination and the environment and globalisation.
In the final lines of the Beitra« ge, Heidegger rehearses and develops some of the themes touched upon here:`L anguage is grounded in silence. Silence is the most sheltered measure-holding [MaÞ-halten] . It holds the measure, in that it first sets up measures [Es ha« lt das MaÞ, indem es die MaÞ-sta« be erst setzt]. And so language is measure-setting [MaÞ-setzung] Perhaps, given Heidegger's later concerns, it is only apposite that the Beitra« ge should end with a reflection on language. Here, Heidegger opens up the possibility of thinking about measure in a different way, taking measure from language, being, and Da-sein. The strife of world and earth, that theme of the lecture on art but with wider geographical and geopolitical implications, can be traced back to the ground of Da-seinöhuman openness or potential closedness, oblivionöto being. If geography is to make progress in addressing the issues of environment and globalisation, of the relation of time and space and the problematic politics that arise from notions of order and calculation, a rethinking of the notion of measure would be entirely appropriate.
